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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a formal attacker model for nor-
mative multi-agent systems. In this context, an attacker is an agent try-
ing to proﬁt from norm violation, for example because the violation is
not detected, it is not being sanctioned, or the sanction is less than the
proﬁt of violation. To deliberate about norm violations, an attacker has
a self model and a model of the normative multi-agent system, which in
our case have the same structure. Moreover, we assume that an attacker
violates a norm only when it proﬁts from it, and the attacker therefore
plays a violation game with the system. On a variety of examples, we
show also how our model of violation games based also on agent abilities
or power extends our earlier model based on motivations only.
1 Introduction
To study the security of a normative multi-agent system [3], we have to build
a model of an attacker or adversary. Though explicit attacker models are well
known and studied in cryptography and computer security, it seems that the
concept has not been developed thus far for normative multi-agent systems.
In this context, an attacker is an agent trying to proﬁt from norm violation,
for example because the violation is not detected, it is not being sanctioned, or
the sanction is less than the proﬁt of violation [1]. Attacker models extend our
earlier violation games studying fraud and deception [2], because these games
consider only the agents’ decision variables directly controlled by the agents,
without modelling the preconditions of the decisions or their consequences.
In this paper we show that if we consider also the agent’s ability or power to
change the state of the world via conditional eﬀects of decisions, we can model
new interesting violation games. In particular, the attacker can exploit indirect
conﬂicts between eﬀects of decision variables, and incompatible decisions.
The layout of this paper is as follows. We ﬁrst introduce our earlier model
by describing the range of violation games that can be played in it, together
with various violation games involving an attacker that are not covered by the
previous model. Then we introduce our new formal attacker model, and ﬁnally
we illustrate the model by formalizing some of the examples.
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2 Violation Games of Attackers of Normative Systems
Normally an agent fulﬁlls its obligations, because otherwise its behavior counts
as a violation that is sanctioned, and the agent dislikes sanctions [1]. Moreover,
it may dislike violations regardless of sanctions, and it may act according to
the norm regardless whether its behavior counts as a violation. In this section
we discuss four main exceptions to this normal behavior, the former two taken
from [2] are related to motivations only, the latter two are dealing also with
abilities or powers of agents.
First, an agent may violate an obligation when the violation is preferred to
the sanction, like people who like to speed and do not care about the speeding
tickets. In such cases the system may increase its sanctions. An instance occurs
when the agent is sanctioned and does not care about additional sanctions. In
this case the additional sanction may not be high enough, but often the ﬁrst
sanction was too high. An example is the famous Beccaria’s argument against
death penalty: it makes sanctions associated to other crimes irrelevant.
Moreover, the agent may have conﬂicting desires or obligations which it con-
siders more important. First, obligations may conﬂict with each other. E.g., if
the normative system for web access is incoherent it may forbid and oblige at
the same time to access a robot.txt ﬁle. Second, obligations may conﬂict with
the agent’s private preferences, since they are adopted as goals by agents who
respect them. The agent can desire exactly the opposite it is obliged to, e.g., in
a ﬁle sharing system a record company prefers not to share its music ﬁles. In the
case of conﬂict with goals, the matter becomes more complex: besides deciding
whether the obligation is preferred to the goal, the agent must consider whether
it should change its mind. Diﬀerent types of agents can have diﬀerent attitudes
towards goal reconsideration. Third, if an agent does not fulﬁll an obligation,
then there is a conﬂict between the sanction it is subject to and its desires and
goals, since by deﬁnition the sanction must not be preferred. E.g., the sanction
can be the inability to access a resource or the loss of a monetary deposit.
Second, the agent may think that its behavior will not be counted as a vi-
olation, or that it will not be sanctioned. This may be the case in the normal
situation when the agents working for the normative system are lazy, because
the sanction has a cost for the system, but more likely it is due to an action
of the agent. This action may abort the goal of the normative system to count
the agent’s behavior as a violation or to sanction it, as in the case of bribing, or
it may trigger a conﬂict for the normative system. An agent can use recursive
modelling [6] to exploit desires and goals of the normative system thus modifying
its motivations and inducing it not to sanction. In particular, the agent can work
on the conditional desires and goals [5] of the system by triggering some of them
which conﬂict with the goal of sanctioning the agent. We distinguish two situa-
tions. In the ﬁrst case, the normative system has no advantage from the action
executed by the agent. E.g., in some countries members of parliament cannot be
sanctioned, so an agent can become an MP in order not to be punished. In the
second case, the normative system gains an advantage from the action of the
agent. A particular case of this behavior is bribing: some agents working for the
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normative system have a disposition to be bribed, i.e., they have a goal towards
not sanctioning the agent that can be triggered by a payment by part of the
agent; if the payment to the system is smaller than the cost of disk space, then
the agent proﬁts by bribing agents working for the system.
Third, no motivation can lead the agent to fulﬁll an obligation if it cannot
achieve it: e.g., in a ﬁle sharing system the agent may have already reached its
quota of disk space, so it has no space left to put at disposal of the community
it belongs to. Moreover, the diﬀerence with the examples in [2] is that with
abilities there is not necessarily an explicit conﬂict in the obligations posed by
the normative system: the agent may not have enough resources to fulﬁll all the
obligations, or the actions for fulﬁlling the obligations have incompatible eﬀects.
Conﬂicts may arise indirectly also with actions the agent desires to perform, for
example, it cannot use the disk space for installing software it needs.
Fourth, the normative system can be unable to count the behavior as a vio-
lation or sanction it. This behavior is caused by an action of the agent, either
by blocking the sanction directly, or creating a conﬂict with other obligations.
Concerning inﬂuencing the normative system, the explicit modelling of the sys-
tem’s abilities or power allows more ways for the agent to violate obligations
while avoiding the sanction. The recognition of a violation and the sanction may
require some applicability conditions to be achieved. Hence the agent can ma-
nipulate these conditions: it can make it impossible for the system to prosecute
it or to perform the sanction. E.g., an access control system is not able anymore
to block the agent’s connections, since it has changed its IP address. Alterna-
tively, the agent can make it more diﬃcult, and hence more costly, for the system
to execute the prosecution process and the sanction. E.g., some of the agent’s
actions can in fact ‘trigger’ some side eﬀect of the action of sanctioning. The
agent can use proxy servers to connect to some access control system, so that it
is more diﬃcult to block the agent’s connections. This additional cost may make
it not worthwhile to enforce the respect of the obligation.
Moreover, another way of changing the system’s behavior is to trigger some
of its other goals, so that the system is led to plan a solution for achieving also
those goals. Which goal is useful to trigger depends on which action the system is
compelled to execute to achieve the new goal, if the system prefers to achieve that
goal with respect to sanctioning. For example, the agent could launch a denial
of service attack against the system. Since for the system it is more important
to stop the attack than to apply the sanction and it cannot do both actions,
the system drops its decision to sanction the agent. A very particular case of
this situation is due to the fact that, in our model, sanctions are modelled as
conditional goals which are triggered by a violation. So, paradoxically, the agent
can trigger the system’s action by violating some other obligation whose sanction
makes the normative system want not to apply further sanctions. If this new
sanction is less harsh then the ﬁrst one and the system is compelled to punish
only the second obligation ﬁrst, e.g., the goal to apply the ﬁrst sanction prevails
to the goal of applying the second one, then the agent can even beneﬁt from
violating two obligations while being sanctioned for only one.
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3 Attacker Model for Normative Multiagent Systems
To deliberate about norm violations, an attacker model consists of:
A self model of the attacker, distinguishing, for example, between norm in-
ternalizing agents, respectful agents and selﬁsh agents. In this paper we use
a Belief-Desire-Goal model to represent the attacker’s mental attitudes.
A model of the normative multi-agent system, where for eﬃciency rea-
sons we assume that the attacker describes the normative multi-agent system
with the same structures used to describe its self-model. The beliefs, desires
and goals of the system reﬂect these mental attitudes of agents working for
it, such as legislators, judges, and policemen.
A model of interaction, where the agent plays a so-called violation game
with the system, based on recursive modeling [6].
In the deﬁnition of multiagent system, not necessarily all variables are assigned
to an agent, and we introduce eﬀect rules. The description of the world contains
– besides decision variables whose truth value is determined directly by an agent
– also parameters whose truth value can only be determined indirectly. The
distinction between decision variables and parameters is a fundamental principle
in all decision theories or decision logics [4,7]. To distinguish the model developed
in [2] from the one developed in this paper, we call the model in this paper our
second normative multi-agent system.
Deﬁnition 1 (Agent description). The tuple 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥〉 is
our second multiagent system MAS2, where
– the agents A, variables X, desires D and goals G are four ﬁnite disjoint sets.
We write M = D ∪G for the motivations deﬁned as the union of the desires
and goals.
– an agent description AD : A → 2X∪D∪G is a complete function that maps
each agent to sets of decision variables, desires and goals. For each agent
a ∈ A, we write Xa for X ∩ AD(a), Da for D ∩ AD(a), Ga for G ∩ AD(a).
We write parameters P = X \ ∪a∈AXa.
– the set of literals built from X, written as L(X), is X ∪ {¬x | x ∈ X}, and
the set of rules built from X, written as R(X) = 2L(X) × X, is the set of
pairs of a set of literals built from X and a literal built from X, written as
{l1, . . . , ln} → l. We also write l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l and when n = 0 we write

 → l. Moreover, for x ∈ X we write ∼x for ¬x and ∼(¬x) for x.
– the set of eﬀects E ⊆ R(X) is a set of rules built from X.
– the motivational description MD : M → R(X) is a complete function from
the sets of desires and goals to the set of rules built from X. For a set of
motivations S ⊆ M , we write MD(S) = {MD(s) | s ∈ S}.
– a priority relation ≥: A → 2M ×2M is a function from agents to a transitive
and reﬂexive relation on the powerset of the motivations containing at least
the subset relation. We write ≥a for ≥ (a).
46 G. Boella and L. van der Torre
We model the attacker and the normative multiagent system as two agents a
and n, such that we can describe the interaction between the attacker and the
system as a game between two agents. In the deﬁnition of normative multiagent
system, we add the fact that violations can be mapped on parameters as well
as decision variables of system n, which formalizes the property that in some
circumstances system n may not be able to count behavior as violation. More-
over, we change the deﬁnition of goal distribution such that agents can also be
responsible for parameters.
Deﬁnition 2 (Norm description). Let 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥〉 be our
second multiagent system. The tuple 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥,n, N, V,GD〉
is our second normative multiagent system NMAS2, where:
– the normative system n ∈ A is an agent.
– the norms N = {n1, . . . , nm} is a set disjoint from A, X, D, and G.
– the norm description V : N × A → Xn ∪ P is a complete function from
the norms to the decision variables of the normative agent together with the
parameters: we write V (n, a) for the decision variable which represents that
there is a violation of norm n by agent a ∈ A.
– the goal distribution GD : A → 2Gn is a function from the agents to the
powerset of the goals of the normative agent, where GD(a) ⊆ Gn represents
the goals of agent n the agent a is responsible for, such that if we have
L → l ∈ MD(GD(a)), then l ∈ L(Xa ∪ P ).
4 Obligations in the Normative Multi-agent System
We introduce a logic of rules out for the desires and goals of the agents, and a
second logic of rules for the eﬀect rules, called outE. Both take the transitive
closure of a set of rules, called reusable input/output logic in [8], but the latter
also includes the input in the output.
Deﬁnition 3 (Out). Let MAS2 = 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥〉 be our second
multiagent system. Moreover, let:
– out(D,S) be the closure of S ⊆ L(X) under the rules D ⊆ R(X):
• out0(D,S) = ∅
• outi+1(D,S) = outi(D,S) ∪ {l | L → l ∈ D,L ⊆ outi(D,S) ∪ S} for
i ≥ 0
• out(D,S) = ∪∞0 out(D,S)
Moreover, following notational conventions in input/output logics, we write
a → x ∈ out(R) for x ∈ out(R, {a}).
– outE(E,S) be the closure of S ⊆ L(X) under the eﬀect rules E:
• outE0(E,S) = S
• outEi+1(E,S) = outEi(E,S) ∪ {l | L → l ∈ E,L ⊆ outEi(E,S)} for
i ≥ 0
• outE(E,S) = ∪∞0 outE(E,S)
Moreover, we write a → x ∈ outE(R) for x ∈ outE(R, {a}).
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Example 1. Consider the multiagent system 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥〉 where
A = {a,n}, Xa = {x}, Xn = {y}. Agent a desires and wants unconditionally
to decide to do x, but if agent n decides y, then it wants the opposite ¬x:
MD(Da) = MD(Ga) = {
 → x, y → ¬x}. The second rule is preferred over
the ﬁrst one, the ordering ≥a is {
 → x, y → ¬x} > {y → ¬x} > {
 → x} > ∅.
System n desires and wants to do y: MD(Dn) = MD(Gn) = {
 → y}. More-
over, assume P = {p, q} and E = {
 → p, x → q, y → ¬q}. The output is
given in Figure 1. The unconditional eﬀect rule 
 → p represents what is true
in the initial state. outE(E, {x}) = {x, p, q}, while outE(E, {y}) = {x, p,¬q}.
The remainder of this ﬁgure is explained in the following section.
U(δa ∪ δn,a)





x
¬x

	

y
¬y
x, y, p, q,¬q
x,¬y, p, q
¬x, y,¬q
¬x,¬y
outE(E, {y} ∪ {¬x})
outE(E, {¬y} ∪ {¬x})
y
¬y
outE(E, {¬y} ∪ {x})
outE(E, {y} ∪ {x})
x, p, q
outE(E, {x})
outE(E, {¬x})
¬x, p
δnδa
y → ¬x
 → x
 → x

	
Fig. 1. Violation game tree
The obligations, count-as-violations as well as sanctions can be parameters,
which can only be achieved indirectly by the agents’ decisions. For count-as-
violations and sanctions, we extend the deﬁnition of obligation with the addi-
tional clause that the normative agent has at least one way to apply the sanction.
To formalize this clause, we already have to deﬁne what decisions are (which in
[2] we could delay until the section on behavior).
Deﬁnition 4 (Decisions). The set of decisions Δ is the set of subsets
δ ⊆ L(X \ P ) such that their closure under eﬀect rules outE(E, δ) does not
contain a variable and its negation. For an agent a ∈ A and a decision δ ∈ Δ
we write δa for δ ∩ L(Xa).
Given decisions we deﬁne the ability of an agent to make true a propositional
variable in a certain context by means of a decision:
Deﬁnition 5 (Ability). Agent a ∈ A is able to achieve p ∈ L(X) in context
Y ⊆ L(X), written as able(a, p, Y ), if and only if there is a decision δa such that
p ∈ outE(E, Y ∪ δa).
In the following section we show that for our recursive games the new clauses
do not imply that the normative agent can always count behavior as a violation
and sanction it. The reason is that some decisions of the normative multi-agent
system can be blocked due to decisions of agent a. E.g., if agent a sees to it that
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a parameter p is true, then all decisions of system n are blocked that would see
to ¬p, because the eﬀects of decision must be consistent.
Deﬁnition 6 (Obligation). Let
NMAS2 = 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥,n, N, V,GD〉
be our second normative multiagent system. In NMAS2 agent a ∈ A is obliged
to decide to do x ∈ L(Xa ∪ P ) with sanction s ∈ L(Xn ∪ P ) if Y ⊆ L(Xa ∪ P ),
written as NMAS2 |= Oan(x, s|Y ), if and only if ∃n ∈ N such that:
1. Y → x ∈ out(Dn) ∩ out(GD(a)): if Y then system n desires and has as a
goal that x, and this goal has been distributed to agent a.
2. Y ∪ {∼x} → V (n, a) ∈ out(Dn)∩ out(Gn): if Y and ∼x is done by agent a,
then system n has the goal and the desire V (n, a): to recognize it as a viola-
tion done by agent a.
3. 
 → ¬V (n, a) ∈ out(Dn): system n desires that there are no violations.
4. Y ∪ {V (n, a)} → s ∈ out(Dn) ∩ out(Gn): if Y and system n decides V (n, a)
then system n desires and has as a goal that it sanctions agent a.
5. Y →∼s ∈ out(Dn): system n desires not to sanction, ∼s. This desire of the
normative system expresses that it only sanctions in case of a violation.
6. Y →∼ s ∈ out(Da): if Y , then agent a desires ∼ s, which expresses that it
does not like to be sanctioned.
7. able(n, V (n, a), Y ∪{∼ x}): system n is able to achieve V (n, a) in context Y
and ∼ x;
8. able(n, s, Y ∪ {V (n, a),∼ x}): system n is able to achieve s in context Y ,
V (n, a) and ∼ x.
An obligation Oan(x, s|Y ) is an ought-to-do obligation when x ⊆ L(Xa), and
an ought-to-be obligation otherwise.
The following example illustrates that the agent does not always know how to
fulﬁll ought-to-be obligations.
Example 2. Consider 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥,n, N, V,GD〉 with A = {a,n},
Xa = {b}, Xn = {V (n, a),m}, P = {p, x}, N = {n}, MD(GD(a)) = {
 → x}.
Agent a desires ¬s: MD(Da) = {
 → ¬s}. Agent n desires and goals are:
MD(Dn) = {
 → x,¬x → V (n, a), V (n, a) → s,
 → ¬V (n, a),
 → ¬s} and
MD(Gn) = {
 → x,¬x → V (n, a), V (n, a) → s,
 → ¬V (n, a),
 → ¬s}.
Assume E = {
 → p, b → x, p → ¬x}. In this situation, agent a cannot
fulﬁll the obligation, because there does not exist a decision δ = δa ∪ δn such
that x ∈ outE(E, δ). The parameter x could be achieved by means of action b
since b → x ∈ E. But in the initial state the parameter p is true (
 → p ∈ E)
and p → ¬x ∈ E: hence, {b} is not a decision of agent a, otherwise we have
{x,¬x} ∈ outE(E, δ′).
An Attacker Model for Normative Multi-agent Systems 49
5 Formalization of Violation Games of Attacker
The basic picture is visualized in Figure 1 and reﬂects the deliberation of agent a
in various stages. This ﬁgure should be read as follow. Agent a is the decision
maker: it is making a decision δa, and it is considering the eﬀects of the fulﬁlment
or the violation of the obligations it is subject to. To evaluate a decision δa
according to its desires and goals (Da and Ga), it must consider not only its
actions, but also the reaction of system n: n is the normative system, which
may recognize and sanction violations. Agent a recursively models system n’s
decision δn (that system n takes according to agent a’s point of view), typically
whether it counts the decision δa as a violation and whether it sanctions agent a
or not, and then bases its decision on it. Now, to ﬁnd out which decision system n
will make, agent a has a proﬁle of system n: it has a representation of system n’s
motivational state. When agent a makes its decision and predict system n’s
decision, we assume in this paper that it believes that system n is aware of
it.
Deﬁnition 7 (Recursive modelling). Let
NMAS2 = 〈A,X,D,G,AD,E,MD,≥,n, N, V,GD〉
be a normative multiagent system.
– Let the unfulﬁlled motivations of decision δ for agent a ∈ A be the set of
motivations whose body is part of the closure of the decision under the eﬀect
rules but whose head is not.
U(δ, a) = {m ∈ M ∩ MD(a) | MD(m) = l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l, {l1, . . . , ln} ⊆
outE(E, δ) and l ∈ outE(E, δ)}
– A decision δ (where δ = δa ∪ δn) is optimal for agent n if and only if there
is no decision δ′n such that U(δ,n) >n U(δa ∪ δ′n,n). A decision δ is optimal
for agent a and agent n if and only if it is optimal for agent n and there is
no decision δ′a such that for all decisions δ
′ = δ′a ∪ δ′n and δa ∪ δ′′n optimal
for agent n we have that U(δ′, a) >a U(δa ∪ δ′′n, a).
In Example 3, the desire of agent a (that p is true) conﬂicts in an indirect
way with x, the normative goal of Oan(x, s | 
). The eﬀect rules E represent
the incompatibility of the eﬀects of the two decision variables x (which has
eﬀect ¬p) and b (which achieves p). {x, b} is not a decision of agent a since
outE(E, {x, b}) = {x, b, p,¬p} is not consistent.
The choice between x and b is taken by comparing the results of recursive
modelling: if x then outE(E, δa ∪ δn) = {x,¬b,¬p,¬V (n, a),¬s} and if b then
outE(E, δa∪δn) = {b,¬x, V (n, a), s}. Since agent a prefers not being sanctioned
with respect to leaving p unfulﬁlled, it chooses x. The priority order on the
motivations is implicitly represented by the numerical index of the rules. A
higher number represents a higher priority.
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Example 3. Oan(x, s | 
)
P p
E x → ¬p, b → p
Agent a Agent n
Xa x, b Xn V (n, a), s
Da  →2 ¬s, →1 p Dn  →
5 x,¬x →4 V (n,a), V (n,a) →3 s,
 →2 ¬V (n, a), →1 ¬s
Ga Gn  →5 x,¬x →4 V (n,a), V (n,a) →3 s
δa x,¬b δn ¬V (n,a),¬s
Ua  →1 p Un
outE(E, δ) x,¬b,¬p,¬V (n, a),¬s
In the next example, agent a has to choose between two obligations which,
even if they are not explicitly conﬂicting, it cannot respect at the same time, since
fulﬁlling the ﬁrst one (the ought-to-do obligation Oan(x, s | 
)) makes it impossi-
ble to do anything for the second one (the ought-to-be obligation Oan(p, s′ | 
)).
Example 4. Oan(x, s | 
), Oan(p, s′ | 
)
P p
E x → ¬p, y → p
Agent a Agent n
Xa x, y Xn V (n, a), s, V (n′,a), s′
Da  →2 ¬s, →1 ¬s′ Dn
 →10 x,¬x →9 V (n,a), V (n,a) →8 s,
 →4 ¬V (n, a), →3 ¬s,
 →7 p,¬p →6 V (n′,a), V (n′,a) →5 s′,
 →2 ¬V (n′,a), →1 ¬s′
Ga Gn
 →10 x,¬x →9 V (n,a), V (n,a) →8 s,
 →7 p,¬p →6 V (n′,a), V (n′,a) →5 s′
δa x,¬y δn ¬V (n,a), s, V (n′,a), s′
Ua  →1 ¬s′ Un  →7 p, →2 ¬V (n′,a), →1 ¬s′
outE(E, δ) x,¬y,¬p,¬V (n,a),¬s, V (n′,a), s′
In the next example, we again model the sanction s as a parameter which
is made true by a decision variable m ∈ Xn. However, this time agent a does
not directly make the sanction impossible. Rather, it triggers some goals of
agent n. We examine how agent a exploits the recursive modelling to inﬂuence
the behavior of the normative agent. Besides the usual goals and desires described
by the obligation to do x, here we assume that, in a situation where p is true,
agent n has the goal to make the decision variable r ∈ Xn true. So, given
p ∈ P , it would like to choose decision δn = {V (n, a),m, r}: but the two decision
variables m and r are incompatible. Since the conditional desire p → r ∈ out(Dn)
is preferred to V (n, a) → s ∈ out(Dn), agent n recognizes the violation (V (n, a))
but it does not sanction agent a.
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Example 5. Oan(x, s | 
)
P p, s
E b → p,m → s, r → ¬s
Agent a Agent n
Xa x, b Xn V (n, a),m, r
Da  →3 ¬s, →2 ¬x, →1 ¬b Dn
p →6 r, →5 x,¬x →4 V (n,a),
V (n, a) →3 s,
 →2 ¬V (n, a), →1 ¬s
Ga Gn
p →6 r, →5 x,¬x →4 V (n,a),
V (n, a) →3 s
δa b,¬x δn V (n, a), r,¬m
Ua  →1 ¬b Un  →5 x, V (n,a) →3 s, →2 ¬V (n,a)
outE(E, δ) ¬x, p, V (n,a), b,¬m
6 Summary
With the increase of multiagent systems with explicit norms, their security be-
comes an urgent problem. To deal with a wide range of possible attacks, we need
an expressive attacker model. In this paper we considered the abilities or power
of agents, and two new kinds of examples, either due to the inability or lack
of power of the attacker itself, or due to the inabilities or lack of power of the
normative system. A topic of further research is the extension of our model to
reason about beliefs and observations of attackers and normative systems [1].
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